Negative Brief: Carter Doctrine - Good

Megan McKinley contributed evidence to this brief, along with “Coach Vance” Trefethen

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY – AFF focus on oil misses important issues in our policy toward the Middle East 3

US involvement in the Middle East was originally about oil, but now it has many other aspects (like terrorism) 3

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY 3

We must prevent hostile powers from controlling the Middle East and we should use force to continue the flow of oil 3

US should continue its military presence in the Persian Gulf. 3

The US needs to improve relations in the Persian Gulf, not harm them. 4

SOURCE INDICTMENT 4

Prof. Andrew Bacevich, Aff plan advocate 4

INHERENCY 5

Obama is revoking the Carter Doctrine - US military presence is receding. AFF advocate Andrew Bacevich said in 2013: 5

HARMS 5

US military presence stabilizes the region – it’s good, not bad 5

Minor Repair: Stability requires military presence plus more engagement with Iran. Let’s keep status quo military presence plus increase our diplomacy with Iran, instead of dropping the Carter Doctrine 5

DISADVANTAGES 6

1. Regional Instability 6

Link: Persian Gulf region has threats to stability - Carter Doctrine ensures stability 6

Link: World markets react swiftly to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies 6

Impact: Oil price spikes cause great economic damage 6

2. Strait of Hormuz sea lanes 7

Link: Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, which carries 17 million barrels/day of oil 7

Link: US military action would be needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz and stabilize oil prices 7

Impact: Oil price shocks hurt the US and world economy 7

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether 8

3. Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia. 8

Link: Saudi’s days are numbered. The Saudi regime is in trouble with its own people because of corruption and disrespect for human rights, and they will be hit with popular wrath like others in the region 8

Link: Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia could eliminate 8.4 million barrels/day, significantly affect global energy markets and world economy. US needs to be prepared 8

Brink: Saudi Arabia dominates the oil market 9

Link & Impact: US military power in the Persian Gulf would prevent a political and economic disaster. 9

Impact: Losing 5.4 million barrels/day would lose $214 billion from US economy, 1.5 million jobs 9

4. Loss of US credibility 10

Link: Lack of US commitment to allies in the Middle East would cause loss of credibility in time of crisis 10

Impact: Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy 10

5. Vulnerable Saudi oil facilities. 11

Link: The US is currently helping to protect Saudi Arabian oil. 11

Link: Saudi Arabian oil facilities are vulnerable to attack. 11

Brink: Even the smallest disruption would have a large impact on supply. 11

Brink:  Saudi Arabia is key to global oil market stability. 11

Brink: Saudi Arabia is the focal point of the global oil market. 12

Impact: Collapse of Saudi oil production = deep economic impact around the world 12

Impact: Global economic downturn. 12

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether 12

RESPONSES TO AFF ARGUMENTS: 13

No other country can defend Saudi Arabia - they’ve already tried 13

“Saudis can defend themselves” - Response: Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself 13

6. Rise of Iran. 13

Link: US military presence in the region is key to deterring Iran’s aggression 13

Link: All the Persian Gulf states are worried about defending themselves against Iran 13

Link & Brink: No other country has the capability to provide security in the Persian Gulf 14

Link: US commitment to the region is necessary and key to managing Iran 14

Link: Iran is increasing its offensive capabilities 14

Impact: Terrorism and confrontation. Iran foments terrorism and confrontation in the region 15

7. End of the Petrodollar 15

Link: Affirmative removes US military protection from Saudi Arabia 15

Link: The “Petrodollar” arrangement. Saudi pricing of oil in dollars depends on US military protection 15

Link: Petrodollar Policy established the US dollar’s status as a world reserve currency 15

Link & Brink: Collapse of the dollar is closer than we realize as the dollar erodes while the federal debt grows 16

Impact: $225 billion impact on US economy 16

8. Mid-East Nuclear Arms Race 17

Link: Affirmative removes security guarantees from the Persian Gulf region 17

Link: US security keeps nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia 17

Brink: Saudi Arabia fears Iran getting a nuclear bomb and is considering building one of its own 17

Impact: Nuclear war. Mid East countries would deploy nuclear weapons with the intention of using them 17

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY – AFF focus on oil misses important issues in our policy toward the Middle East

US involvement in the Middle East was originally about oil, but now it has many other aspects (like terrorism)

Dr. Jeff Myhre 2013. (PhD at the London School of Economics in international relations) American Energy Independence Might Not Change Things Much 20 Feb 2013 <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/20/american-energy-independence-might-not-change-things-much/>

Because of the Al Qaeda murders of 2001 and because of the Arab Spring (and yes, the collapse of the USSR), American policy across North Africa into the Middle East and beyond to Indonesia, has experienced mission creep, for want of a better term. America had a primary interest in access to oil, but in acting on that interest, the country became entangled in other political aspects of the region. In other words, we are so involved now that energy is merely one component of our array of interests. If energy vanished entirely from the equation, Al Qaeda and other jihadi groups would continue to target America and those close to it. The Arab Spring has illustrated the split between rulers and ruled in many countries where America has established a presence; which side America backs may be tied to access to energy, but many other consideration enter the picture.

REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

We must prevent hostile powers from controlling the Middle East and we should use force to continue the flow of oil

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that no hostile power exercises hegemony over the Middle East, which is not only a key region for energy production, global trade, and investment, but also a potential source of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The U.S. will likely need to selectively use force to ensure the continued flow of oil from the region, as it did in Operation Desert Storm. Securing the oil fields and supporting allies, especially GCC members and pro- American elements in Saudi Arabia, may be imperative.

US should continue its military presence in the Persian Gulf.

Anthony H. Cordesman 2011 (holds Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; consultant to the U.S. State Dept, Defense Dept, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Sec. of Defense) April 14, 2011 “U.S. Strategy in the Gulf” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES<http://csis.org/publication/us-strategy-gulf>

The US must assure its partners in the Southern Gulf that it will stay in the region, and maintain a strong and active presence in the bases and facilities the US is allowed to use in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The US should reinforce the fact that it does not want to leave any key facility or access capability it the Gulf. It should not leave any fears that it will not make use of such facilities to protect the host country, and it should – wherever possible – seek to work as a partner with host country forces, rather than turn to a US-only approach.

The US needs to improve relations in the Persian Gulf, not harm them.

Anthony H. Cordesman 2011 (holds Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies; consultant to the U.S. State Dept, Defense Dept, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Sec. of Defense) April 14, 2011 “U.S. Strategy in the Gulf” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/publication/us-strategy-gulf>

The US will have to rebalance its relationships with every Southern Gulf state, restore their confidence and trust that the US will stay engaged in the region in spite of calls for budget cuts. The US will also have to restore their trust that it will support them in dealing with key security issues at a time when some regional leaders feel the US effectively abandoned Mubarak. At some level, the US will also have to establish a new approach to balancing its strategic interest with efforts to help each Southern Gulf state deal with the need for reform and a reduction in internal political tensions. Such efforts may work best as the result of quiet, low profile work by the country teams in each embassy, but the US cannot simply be passive and focus on security.

SOURCE INDICTMENT

Prof. Andrew Bacevich, Aff plan advocate

**Analysis: Bacevich’s analysis rests on incorrectly thinking that the Carter Doctrine involved moving Islamic countries into conformity with American interests. But that was never the Carter Doctrine. All Carter said was that we need to protect oil. Carter never advocated transforming any Islamic governments.**

**Dilemma: If Bacevich “does” correctly understand the Carter Doctrine, then he says Obama has already declared an end to it. NEG wins on inherency. However, if he “does not” correctly understand it, then all his Affirmative evidence about its harms is blaming those harms on policies that are not really the Carter Doctrine, which means the AFF plan cannot work effectively.**

Dr. Christian Emery 2014. (PhD; lecturer in International Relations at the University of Plymouth. He completed his PhD at the University of Birmingham and spent three years as a Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics) Obama’s Middle East Strategy and the Ghosts of Carter 3 Jan 2014 <http://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/obama%E2%80%99s-middle-east-strategy-and-ghosts-carter>

The legacy of Carter’s pivot towards the Gulf was revisited in a recent [Op-Ed](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/with-iran-obama-can-end-americas-long-war-for-the-middle-east/2013/12/06/4ab56fd4-5c3e-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_print.html" \t "_blank) for Washington PostOp-Ed by Andrew J. Bacevich, professor of international relations at Boston University. ‘What Jimmy Carter began’, Bacevich declared, ‘Barack Obama is ending. Washington is bringing down the curtain on its 30-plus-year military effort to pull the Islamic world into conformity with American interests and expectations. It's about time.’ Bacavich holds that the massive American military build-up in the Middle East has been premised on a grossly exaggerated threat to US interests there and an entirely unrealistic expectation of  America’s capacity to establish perpetual security. The result has been few strategic benefits at the cost of considerable blood and treasure. On these grounds, it’s a persuasive argument. But the argument that Obama is ending a strategy that for three decades has been premised on a continuous theme is ultimately flawed. The Carter Doctrine did indeed reverse the Nixon’s Doctrine’s reliance on regional proxies, and the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) ultimately bore fruit when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990. Yet, none of the former Carter officials I have interviewed would take seriously the notion that they were launching a strategy to pull the Islamic world into conformity with American interests and expectations. The Iranian Revolution had already demonstrated the futility of such an approach. The Carter Doctrine had its origins in changing assessments of the Soviet threat in the Gulf. Its rationale ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The subsequent growth of America’s interest in the region was uneven and ad-hoc. Hardly surprising given that it was responding to wildly different events and threat-perceptions; an Arab-Persian war, a post-cold war inter-Arab war, the rise of ‘rogue state’ discourse, new patterns of WMB proliferation, changing norms related to liberal intervention, the growth of transnational terrorism, and perhaps most damagingly, a unique bout of ideological hubris exasperated by 9/11.

INHERENCY

Obama is revoking the Carter Doctrine - US military presence is receding. AFF advocate Andrew Bacevich said in 2013:

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2013. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) 6 Dec 2013 WASHINGTON POST With Iran, Obama can end America’s long war for the Middle East <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/with-iran-obama-can-end-americas-long-war-for-the-middle-east/2013/12/06/4ab56fd4-5c3e-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html>

Back in 1980, when his promulgation of the Carter Doctrine launched that effort, Carter acted with only a vague understanding of what might follow. Yet circumstance — the overthrow of the shah in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — compelled him to act. Or more accurately, the domestic political uproar triggered by those events compelled the president, facing a tough reelection campaign, to make a show of doing something. What ensued was the long-term militarization of U.S. policy throughout the region. Now, without fanfare, President Obama is effectively revoking Carter’s doctrine. The U.S. military presence in the region is receding.

HARMS

US military presence stabilizes the region – it’s good, not bad

Minor Repair: Stability requires military presence plus more engagement with Iran. Let’s keep status quo military presence plus increase our diplomacy with Iran, instead of dropping the Carter Doctrine

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress, working with Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb. He earned an M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, <http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/publications/2008/7/pb651/get_pdf>

The U.S. military presence in the region does serve as a deterrent to hostile actions by violent extremists and aggressive state actors, and so it is a force that helps to provide stability in a volatile region. Our military presence in the region has remained robust for the past thirty years. It grew substantially after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and then again after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. But, by itself, it has not been able to produce anything close to sustainable regional stability, which is why it is imperative that our military efforts be matched by sustained diplomatic and economic engagement with all the regional states, including Iran.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Regional Instability

Link: Persian Gulf region has threats to stability - Carter Doctrine ensures stability

Link: World markets react swiftly to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies

**Notes & Analysis: Even “perceived” interruptions can cause problems in world oil markets. There doesn’t have to be a big war breaking out, just concerns or perceptions can cause oil price impacts. That’s why we need the Carter Doctrine to stabilize the region and minimize the fear of disruptions.**

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress, working with Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb. He earned an M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, [http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/publications/2008/7/pb651/get\_pdf](http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf/++atfield++file)

We know from past and present experience just how swiftly world markets react to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies. That is one reason why it is in the interest of the United States and the international community to promote and maintain stability in the region where the majority of the world’s chief source of crude oil is produced. The main reason for President Carter’s declaration twenty-eight years ago—fear of encroachment on the Straits of Hormuz by the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan at the height of the cold war—no longer exists. Yet the need to protect the free flow of oil from the region is even more critical today than it was three decades ago. In 1980, the United States produced 3.1 billion barrels of oil a year and imported 1.9 billion. Today, the United States produces only 1.9 billion barrels a year and imports 3.7 billion, and new challenges threatening regional stability have emerged and in some ways have grown more difficult.

Impact: Oil price spikes cause great economic damage

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

Nonetheless, whether driven by demand or supply, a large enough spike in the price of oil can do great damage. Economists call such abrupt responses “non-linearities” and they suggest that when the price rises fast enough, consumers and businesses trim their spending and investment plans. This is often because prices are driven by other factors that hurt confidence, such as wide unrest in the Middle East. If another Arab government were toppled, pushing the oil price over $150, the economic impact would almost certainly be larger than the 0.5% to 1% of GDP that simple extrapolation suggests.

2. Strait of Hormuz sea lanes

Link: Iran threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz, which carries 17 million barrels/day of oil

David Blair 2012. (journalist) 23 Jan 2012 “Iran threatens to close Strait of Hormuz over EU oil sanctions” THE TELEGRAPH (British newspaper) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/9032948/Iran-threatens-to-close-Strait-of-Hormuz-over-EU-oil-sanctions.html>

Britain, America and France delivered a pointed signal to Iran, sending six warships led by a 100,000 ton aircraft carrier through the highly sensitive waters of the Strait of Hormuz. The naval deployment, led by an aircraft carrier, defied explicit Iranian threats to close the waterway. It coincided with an escalation in the West's confrontation with Iran over the country's nuclear ambitions. The EU embargo on Iranian oil exports, amounts to the most significant package of sanctions yet agreed. They are also likely to impose a partial freeze on assets held by the Iranian Central Bank in the EU. Tehran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation. Tankers carrying 17 million barrels of oil pass through this waterway every day, accounting for 35 per cent of the world's seaborne crude shipments.

Link: US military action would be needed to clear the Strait of Hormuz and stabilize oil prices

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

Iranian threats to block oil shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, if acted upon, could disrupt the global energy supply and cause oil prices to spike. However, as this report suggests, this scenario is relatively short term. It leaves the oil-producing infrastructure intact, and prices would stabilize if military action, led by the United States, and a coordinated international response successfully restore security to the sea-lanes.

Impact: Oil price shocks hurt the US and world economy

Dr. Shiu-Sheng Chen & Kai-Wei Hsu 2012. (Chen - PhD economics; professor of economics at National Taiwan University; Hsu - economics department, National Taiwan University) Reverse Globalization: Does High Oil Price Volatility Discourage International Trade? Jan 2012, <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36182/1/MPRA_paper_36182.pdf>

It has been shown that the dramatic rise in oil prices during the 1970s was associated with subsequent economic downturns. Although there is some debate as to whether oil price shocks are the main cause of recessions, Hamilton (2009b) asserts that the latest surge in oil prices between June 2007 and June 2008 was an important factor that contributed to the economic recession that began in the US in 2007:Q4. Moreover, a number of recent studies show that oil price shocks have significant effects on a variety of domestic economic activities. An increase in oil prices has a significant negative impact on GDP growth and contributes to a higher inflation rate for most countries (see Hamilton (2009a), Cologni and Manera (2008), and Lardic and Mignon (2008)). Finally, Ordonez et al. (2011) show that the oil price shock is an important driving force of the cyclical labor adjustments in the US labor market, and the job-finding probability is the main transmission mechanism of such a shock.

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768> (“Force Majeur” is something with the legal impact of an Act of God, like a natural disaster, that would justify breaking contracts)

If the supply situation worsens, opportunities for this type of substitution will be fewer, creating supply bottlenecks, shortages of petrol and spikes within price spikes for different crudes and products, even when spare capacity remains. The price differential of about $15 a barrel that has built up between Brent crude, which more closely reflects global trade, and West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for oil prices in America, is a good example of how oil markets can become distorted by local patterns of supply and demand. If supply gets even more stretched, oil could fetch a far higher price in some parts of the world than others. If supply problems become really grave, oil companies may even declare *force majeure*, raising the prospect that, as in 1978, oil markets fail altogether.

3. Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia.

**“Arab Spring” refers to the events that occurred in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt where their dictatorial governments were overthrown by popular movements. This Disad argues that the same thing will happen in Saudi Arabia sooner or later, and the US had better be prepared to act with our military in the region when it does.**

Link: Saudi’s days are numbered. The Saudi regime is in trouble with its own people because of corruption and disrespect for human rights, and they will be hit with popular wrath like others in the region

Erick Stakelbeck 2012. (journalist) 5 Mar 2012 Why the Saudis' Downfall Could Impact America , CBN NEWS, <http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2012/March/Why-the-Saudis-Downfall-Could-Impact-America/>

Then, after governments fell in Tunisia and Egypt, the Saudi royals moved to appease their own restless subjects with billions of dollars in new welfare and housing programs. "It is absolutely bribery. That's what it is. When this uprising started, they started getting nervous," said Dr. Ali Alyami, of the Washington-based Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia. Alyami believes the Royal Family's days are numbered. "The Saudi people suffer from corruption, lack of political freedom, lack of religious freedom, lack of press freedom, injustice, no accountability, no transparency," he told CBN News. "So the same problems that led all of these Arabs to take to the streets are in Saudi Arabia," Alyami said. "So regardless of all the bribes -- they know it, actually -- they are not going to be spared the wrath of the people."

Link: Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia could eliminate 8.4 million barrels/day, significantly affect global energy markets and world economy. US needs to be prepared

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A complete disruption of Saudi oil production (8.4 million barrels per day) caused by an “Arab Spring” uprising would significantly affect global energy markets and overall economic activity. The United States needs to prepare domestic and international measures before such a disruption of the energy supply and be prepared to secure its access to foreign and domestic oil resources. This preparation will enable the U.S. to lead effectively during such a crisis.

Brink: Saudi Arabia dominates the oil market

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

The Saudi Kingdom is the largest oil producer in the world—occasionally surpassed by Russia—and essentially dominates the oil market due to its large excess production capacity, which it can ramp up to 12 mbd. A prolonged and massive disruption of Saudi oil production would significantly affect global energy markets and economic activity.

Link & Impact: US military power in the Persian Gulf would prevent a political and economic disaster.

**Following in context from the comments above about the risk of an Arab Spring in Saudi Arabia, Cohen, Kreutzer, Phillips & Bendikova in 2012 go on to conclude:**

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

The United States should maintain a military force structure that can project U.S. power into the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia. This along with using U.S. influence in international institutions to secure the release of members’ strategic petroleum reserves would help to prevent a political and economic disaster in the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Impact: Losing 5.4 million barrels/day would lose $214 billion from US economy, 1.5 million jobs

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

However, the initial shock of the net loss of 5.4 mbd in the petroleum market has a corresponding impact on the U.S. economy with the greatest impacts occurring in the first two years. Over the first two years, U.S. GDP loses $214 billion per year. Employment averages 1.1 million jobs below the baseline, bottoming out at more than 1.5 million lost jobs in the second quarter of the second year.

4. Loss of US credibility

Link: Lack of US commitment to allies in the Middle East would cause loss of credibility in time of crisis

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior .Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A crisis in Saudi Arabia would have drastic implications for the United States, its economy, and the whole world. The optimistic scenario modeled here presupposes a one-year cessation of production followed by a two-year recovery. In the real world, the exact length of the recovery period is difficult to predict. Gasoline prices would rise from $3.95 to more than $6.50 per gallon, petroleum prices would rise from $100 per barrel to more than $220 per barrel, employment losses would exceed 1.5 million jobs, and U.S. GDP would drop by a total of nearly $450 billion. Based on prior Heritage energy simulation exercises, in such a scenario the United States would fail to actively engage its bilateral partners to prevent its adversaries from exploiting this crisis and harming global U.S. and allied interests. This would likely lead to the loss of American credibility with its partners and adversaries around the world. U.S. allies would expect tangible actions and clear commitments from the United States, especially during a global crisis such as the collapse of Saudi oil production. A United States that lacks a proactive international policy that promptly reaches out to its allies and friends would be perceived as weak.

Impact: Last time we lost national credibility, a lot of really bad things happened to our foreign policy

George Kourous 2000. (masters thesis for Master of Arts, International Affairs, Center for International Studies, Ohio Univ) SHADOW BOXING: International Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War, (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://shadowboxing.kourous.net/2.international.pdf>

The image of the last American helicopters fleeing Saigon in 1975 made an indelible impression upon U.S. officials, who worried that America’s failure had worked “to weaken [allies] and embolden...adversaries,” one analyst observes. “[T]he effect was to raise serious doubts about the credibility of American power.” Kissinger later lamented that “[t]he collapse in 1975…ushered in a period of American humiliation, an unprecedented Soviet geopolitical offensive all over the globe, and pervasive insecurity, instability, and crisis.” And ten years after the fall of Saigon, Richard Nixon wrote that the defeat in Vietnam paralyzed America’s will to act in other Third World trouble spots and therefore encouraged aggression...Over the next five years, Soviet clients and proxy forces unleashed a geopolitical offensive that led to stunning reversals for the United States in virtually every region of the world, [for example] the fall one by one of Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. As Washington’s national security establishment mulled over its failure in Vietnam, the post-Watergate presidency of James Carter tried to chart a foreign policy course that did not assume the inviolability of U.S. commitments as its underlying principle, but which instead sought to substitute a sort of “moral credibility” for the conventional notion of credibility. For many the results proved disastrous and, unsurprisingly, when global events appeared to indicate an increased threat to U.S. interests, the pressured administration quickly returned to more familiar strategies.

5. Vulnerable Saudi oil facilities.

Link: The US is currently helping to protect Saudi Arabian oil.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” FOX News <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/19/quietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis/>

Despite their deepening political divide, the United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding defense ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to protect the kingdom's oil riches and future nuclear sites. The U.S. also is in discussions with Saudi Arabia to create an air and missile defense system with far greater capability against the regional rival the Saudis fear most, Iran. And it is with Iran mainly in mind that the Saudis are pressing ahead with a historic $60 billion arms deal that will provide dozens of new U.S.-built F-15 combat aircraft likely to ensure Saudi air superiority over Iran for years.

Link: Saudi Arabian oil facilities are vulnerable to attack.

Robert Burns 2011 (Associated Press National Security Writer) May 19, 2011 “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties with Saudis” FOX News <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/05/19/quietly-expanding-defense-ties-saudis/>

The Saudis' security worries were heightened by a failed al-Qaida car bombing in February 2006 of the Abqaiq oil processing facility, one of the largest in the world. The State Department cable said a subsequent U.S. assessment of Abqaiq security standards determined that it remained "highly vulnerable to other types of sophisticated terrorist attacks." That warning was conveyed to top Saudi officials on Oct. 27, 2008. "The Saudis remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy production facilities," the cable said. "They recognize many of their energy facilities remain at risk from al-Qaida and other terrorists who seek to disrupt the global economy."

Brink: Even the smallest disruption would have a large impact on supply.

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” (brackets added) THE ECONOMIST<http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

The crucial question is how much oil will be lost, and for how long. When oil markets operate at the limits of supply, even the smallest extra disruption has a disproportionate effect. On February 26th, for example, Iraq’s biggest refinery shut down after a terrorist attack. This and other assaults could knock out another 500,000 b/d [barrels per day] from the world’s fuel supplies. And if the raids on oil installations in previous elections in Nigeria are anything to go by, the next one, in April, may threaten another 1m b/d of supplies from west Africa. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia remains far from secure (see article).

Brink:  Saudi Arabia is key to global oil market stability.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) 12 Feb 2014 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of the end of January 2014, Saudi Arabia was the second-largest source of U.S crude oil imports, providing more than1.3 million barrels per day (mpd) of the 6.89 mpd in gross U.S. crude imports, behind only Canada. Oil exports to the United States account for roughly 15% of Saudi exports, with East Asia accounting for more than 50%. In 2013, Saudi Arabia produced an average of more than 9 mbd of its estimated 12.5 mbd capacity and had indicated that it may not expand that capacity in light of current trends in international oil markets. Saudi officials have used their spare production capacity to moderate volatility in oil markets in recent years, viewing price stability as a sound investment in maintaining global economic activity, keeping revenues steady, and dissuading further investment by consumers in unconventional oil resources or alternative energy technologies because of high prices. This strategy has contributed to relative calm in markets that otherwise could have been more severely agitated by persistent unrest in the Middle East, loss of supplies from Libya and other producers, and speculation about the impact of sanctions or potential conflict with Iran.

Brink: Saudi Arabia is the focal point of the global oil market.

Christopher M. Blanchard 2011 (Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division for Congressional Research Service) March 10, 2011 “Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf>

With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 266.7 billion barrels), Saudi Arabia produced roughly 8.6 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil as of late December 2010, an increase over the prevailing level for most of 2009 and 2010, but well below the record high production of 9.7 million bpd in mid-2008. Saudi oil reserves, oil exports, and spare oil production capacity make the kingdom the focal point for the global oil market, and recent political unrest in the Middle East has contributed to market concerns and price increases. Saudi Aramco recently completed a multi-year, multi-billion dollar production capacity expansion project that raised its daily crude oil production capacity to 12.5 million bpd. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of December 2010, Saudi Arabia was the third largest source of U.S oil imports, about 1.1 million bpd of 11.1 million bpd gross U.S. imports, behind only Canada and Mexico.

Impact: Collapse of Saudi oil production = deep economic impact around the world

Dr. Ariel Cohen, Dr. David W. Kreutzer, James Phillips, and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Kreutzer - Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Energy Economics and Climate Change in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. Phillips - Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation.) Thinking the Unthinkable: Modeling a Collapse of Saudi Oil Production 9 Apr 2012 <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/bg2671.pdf>

A collapse of Saudi oil production would drastically affect global energy and the economic situation. The economic performance of national economies around the world would suffer, with some falling into deep recession.

Impact: Global economic downturn.

Gavyn Davies 2011. (Gavyn Davies is a macroeconomist who is now chairman of Fulcrum Asset Management and co-founder of Prisma Capital Partners. He was the head of the global economics department at Goldman Sachs from 1987-2001, and was chairman of the BBC from 2001-2004. He has also served as an economic policy adviser in No 10 Downing Street, an external adviser to the British Treasury, and as a visiting professor at the London School of Economics.) February 24, 2011 “How big is the 2011 oil price shock?” FINANCIAL TIMES BLOG <http://blogs.ft.com/gavyndavies/2011/02/24/how-big-is-the-2011-oil-price-shock/>

Each of the last five major downturns in global economic activity has been immediately preceded by a major spike in oil prices. Sometimes (e.g. in the 1970s and in 1990), the surge in oil prices has been due to supply restrictions, triggered by OPEC or by war in the Middle East. Other times (e.g. in 2008), it has been due to rapid growth in the demand for oil. But in both cases the contractionary effects of higher energy prices have eventually proven too much for the world economy to shrug off.

“Markets will solve for oil prices” - Response: If supply problems become severe, oil markets could fail altogether

The Economist 2011. (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

If the supply situation worsens, opportunities for this type of substitution will be fewer, creating supply bottlenecks, shortages of petrol and spikes within price spikes for different crudes and products, even when spare capacity remains. The price differential of about $15 a barrel that has built up between Brent crude, which more closely reflects global trade, and West Texas Intermediate, the benchmark for oil prices in America, is a good example of how oil markets can become distorted by local patterns of supply and demand. If supply gets even more stretched, oil could fetch a far higher price in some parts of the world than others. If supply problems become really grave, oil companies may even declare *force majeure*, raising the prospect that, as in 1978, oil markets fail altogether.

RESPONSES TO AFF ARGUMENTS:

No other country can defend Saudi Arabia - they’ve already tried

Dr. David Ottaway 2011. (PhD in political science; Senior Scholar in the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) Uncle Sam and the Saudi Split, FOREIGN POLICY, 23 Sept 2011  
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/23/uncle_sam_and_the_saudi_split?page=0,1>

It is worth remembering that Saudi King Abdullah became so furious with President George W. Bush just before 9/11 that he wrote an angry letter warning that if Washington did not do something quickly to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Saudi Arabia intended to freeze its relations with Washington and go its own way. Bush scrambled to pacify the king, but the presence of 15 Saudis among the 9/11 hijackers so traumatized both countries that their relations effectively froze anyway. King Abdullah then cast about for other political and military partners that could replace the United States, engaging in an exchange of visits with the leaders of China, India, Pakistan, and Turkey. But he soon discovered that none was likely, or even militarily capable, of coming to the kingdom's rescue the way the United States had done when Iraqi forces rolled across Kuwait to the Saudi border in August 1990.

“Saudis can defend themselves” - Response: Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself

Prof. David Lake 2012. (department of political science, Univ of Calif-San Diego) Legitimating Power: The Domestic Politics of U.S. International Hierarchy, Mar 2012, <http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Lake.pdf>

As proven in 1991, despite billions of dollars of sophisticated weapons purchased from the United States, Saudi Arabia cannot defend itself against the regional forces potentially arrayed against it. This holds even more so for Kuwait, which was overrun by Iraq in one night, and the Emirates, which are equally vulnerable because of their tiny size.

6. Rise of Iran.

Link: US military presence in the region is key to deterring Iran’s aggression

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progressl; M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern Univ) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, [http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/publications/2008/7/pb651/get\_pdf](http://tcf.org/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf/++atfield++file)

There is no doubt that U.S. military power will remain a vital component of any future comprehensive strategy to ensure stability. Iran, for example, will be less likely to take a more aggressive stance in its quest to project militarily its own influence across the region if there is a U.S. military presence ready to counter it. A U.S. military force that is light, flexible, and ready will clearly provide a counterbalance to any potential use by Iran of its own military power.

Link: All the Persian Gulf states are worried about defending themselves against Iran

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

Despite the foregoing, the organizing principle of every Arab Gulf country’s defense posture is the same: Iran. As one Saudi royal put it bluntly, “Iran is everybody’s problem.” By far the most populous of the region’s states, Iran’s imperial past, its presumed ambitions, and its supposed ties to the Shi‘ite communities scattered around the Gulf make it a constant source of worry. As one senior Gulf royal commented in 2007 when discussing Sunni-Shi‘ite tensions, “You don’t understand. Iran has only been Shi‘ite for 500 years. It has been Persian for millennia.”

Link & Brink: No other country has the capability to provide security in the Persian Gulf

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

Beneath the surface, however, is an appreciation of how much of the region’s security order is a consequence of U.S. action and how little ability any other country or collection of countries has to do anything close to what the United States does. While there is fear for the future of the U.S. role, there is at the same time no alternative to it. No other country has the military resources or the will to safeguard what is, in the end, a global commons.

Link: US commitment to the region is necessary and key to managing Iran

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

For many in the Gulf, the rise and decline of U.S. power in absolute terms is a largely academic exercise. Within the neighborhood, the U.S. role is both necessary and durable. More significant is the question of U.S. relative power in the Gulf, especially as it helps shape Iranian action. Most important, however, is ensuring a sense among the parties in the Gulf that their region remains one of principal concern to the United States. An overwhelmingly powerful United States that deemphasized the region would provoke a profound realignment; yet, even a diminished United States that is committed to the region would be overwhelmingly more powerful than any other party and would shape political alignments for years into the future.

Link: Iran is increasing its offensive capabilities

Anthony H. Cordesman 2010 ( holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies. has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies; consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries; served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense) September 14, 2010 “U.S.-Saudi Security Cooperation and the Impact of U.S. Arms Sales” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES <http://csis.org/publication/us-saudi-security-cooperation-and-impact-us-arms-sales>

Iran remains an emerging challenge. It is deeply involved in strategic competition with the United States and its friends and allies in the region. It is developing steadily better capabilities to attack shipping, targets in the Gulf, and targets on the Saudi and southern Gulf coast, and it is using asymmetric warfare in doing so. It is fielding significant long-range missile forces and may acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States is to deter other regional states from proliferation in reaction to Iran, and make its statements about offering “extended regional deterrence” a credible option, it must show it will do its best to create effective regional partners in the southern Gulf, as well as try to build a strategic partnership with Iraq.

Impact: Terrorism and confrontation. Iran foments terrorism and confrontation in the region

Dr. Ariel Cohen and Michaela Bendikova 2012. (Cohen - PhD; Senior Research Fellow in Russian & Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Heritage Foundation. Bendikova - Research Assistant for Missile Defense & Foreign Policy in the Allison Center at Heritage Foundation) Iran’s Menace in Azerbaijan, 16 Mar 2012 <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/03/16/irans-menace-in-azerbaijan/>

Iranians are not only operating terrorist networks on Azerbaijani territory, but are also allegedly behind the 2006 murder of Rafik Tagi, a prominent Azeri writer against whom an Iranian ayatollah issued a fatwa sentencing him to death. The third wave of anti-terrorist arrests since the beginning of the year is seen as a reprisal by Baku to signal to Iran to “play by the rules.” Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have been steadily deteriorating as Azerbaijan continues to develop its ties to the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States has been leading the effort to impose sanctions to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. It is possible that Iran is growing more wary and aggressive as sanctions start to bite. Azerbaijan is not the only country in the region that Iran targets. Iranian intelligence and its Hezbollah subsidiary recently conducted operations against Israeli targets in Tbilisi, Georgia, New Delhi, and Bangkok. According to some experts, Iran is wary of a major confrontation and wants to provoke Israel into smaller confrontations, because it needs an external threat around which it can organize its increasingly dissatisfied population.

7. End of the Petrodollar

Link: Affirmative removes US military protection from Saudi Arabia

Link: The “Petrodollar” arrangement. Saudi pricing of oil in dollars depends on US military protection

Jerry Robinson 2011 (Economist, holds a Bachelor's degree in Economics with Honors from the University of Tulsa. He has taught a course in macroeconomics at the college level. In addition, appeared on numerous TV and radio programs, including FoxNews, to discuss global economic topics. Robinson has been quoted by USA Today and other news agencies on the topic of the economy, and his columns have appeared regularly in numerous print and web publications) May 11, 2011 “Meet the System That Will Collapse the U.S. Dollar (Part 1)” FINANCIAL SENSE INSIDER <http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jerry-robinson/meet-the-system-that-will-collapse-the-us-dollar-part-1>

The petrodollar system originated in the early 1970’s in the wake of the Bretton Woods collapse. In a series of highly secret meetings, the U.S. – represented by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to many commentators – and the Saudi Royal Family made a powerful agreement. According to the agreement, the U.S. offered military protection for Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. What did the U.S. want in exchange? For Saudi Arabia to agree to price all of their oil sales in U.S. dollars and to then invest their surplus oil proceeds into U.S. Treasury Bills. This system was later referred to as “petrodollar recycling” by Henry Kissinger. The Saudis agreed and the petrodollar system was born.

Link: Petrodollar Policy established the US dollar’s status as a world reserve currency

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

What saved the greenback after Nixon removed the U.S. dollar from the gold standard in 1971 — ending the post-war Bretton Woods international financial order — was the status of U.S. dollar as the reserve currency of the world. This began with Saudi Arabia agreeing in 1973 to accept only U.S. dollars as payment for oil in exchange for U.S. protection of the Saudi monarchy and its oilfields. By 1975, the reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar was firmly established, with OPEC members agreeing to trade only in dollars. Trading of other commodities came to be priced in dollars, which reinforced the reserve currency status of the dollar.

Link & Brink: Collapse of the dollar is closer than we realize as the dollar erodes while the federal debt grows

Dr. Scott S. Powell 2012. (Ph.D. in political and economic theory from Boston University) 10 Apr 2012 As U.S. Debt Soars, Dollar May Lose Reserve Status, INVESTORS BUSINESS DAILY, <http://www.discovery.org/a/18671>

On March 29, the China Development Bank agreed with its BRICS' counterparts to eschew dollar lending and extend credit to each other in their own respective currencies. The erosion and loss of the use of the U.S. dollar as the reserve currency means less demand and more dollar selling by central banks around the world, which in turn causes inflation as the dollar weakens against other currencies. Worse, the demise of the dollar's reserve currency status at the same time that federal debt compounds to new heights creates a perfect storm, making a collapse of the dollar closer than most Americans realize.

Impact: $225 billion impact on US economy

Dr. Barry Eichengreen 2011. (PhD; professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley) Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End 1 Mar 2011 WALL STREET JOURNAL Foreign Exchange Report <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html>

Conversely, life will become easier for European and Chinese banks and companies, which will be able to do more of their international business in their own currencies. The same will be true of companies in other countries that do most of their business with China or Europe. It will be a considerable convenience—and competitive advantage—for them to be able to do that business in yuan or euros rather than having to go through the dollar.  
U.S. Impact  
In this new monetary world, moreover, the U.S. government will not be able to finance its budget deficits so cheaply, since there will no longer be as big an appetite for U.S. Treasury securities on the part of foreign central banks. Nor will the U.S. be able to run such large trade and current-account deficits, since financing them will become more expensive. Narrowing the current-account deficit will require exporting more, which will mean making U.S. goods more competitive on foreign markets. That in turn means that the dollar will have to fall on foreign-exchange markets—helping U.S. exporters and hurting those companies that export to the U.S. My calculations suggest that the dollar will have to fall by roughly 20%. Because the prices of imported goods will rise in the U.S., living standards will be reduced by about 1.5% of GDP—$225 billion in today's dollars. That is the equivalent to a half-year of normal economic growth. While this is not an economic disaster, Americans will definitely feel it in the wallet.

8. Mid-East Nuclear Arms Race

Link: Affirmative removes security guarantees from the Persian Gulf region

Link: US security keeps nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia

Michael Miner 2011. ( teaching fellow at Harvard Univ.; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and International Society for Iranian Studies) 18 Dec 2011 “Strategic Clarity and the Prospect of a Nuclear Iran” FRONTLINE <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/12/opinion-strategic-clarity-and-the-prospect-of-a-nuclear-iran.html>

Saudi Arabia represents the most likely state to begin a nuclear program in response to developments in Iran. Riyadh may not feel that a U.S. alliance is adequate enough defense on its own accord. With significant pressure from allies and increased security reassurances, these anxieties can be dealt with through political and economic policies. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and given substantial investment in the United States of Saudi assets, it seems reasonable that strategic alliances and guarantees would be adequate to keep nuclear weapons out of Saudi Arabia.

Brink: Saudi Arabia fears Iran getting a nuclear bomb and is considering building one of its own

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” (brackets in original) <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

Speaking with Western researchers, a senior Saudi diplomat said in 2006 that the best way for the Gulf to respond to an Iranian nuclear capability would be “with another nuclear weapon.” “We are naked,” a Saudi prince recently complained. “We are surrounded by a country that already has a nuclear capability [Israel], and a country that is building it [Iran].”

Impact: Nuclear war. Mid East countries would deploy nuclear weapons with the intention of using them

Dr. Richard L. Russell 2010. (PhD; Professor of National Security Affairs in the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and Adjunct Professor of Security Studies in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University) “Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race” NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY 3rd Quarter 2010 <http://www.npolicy.org/article_file/Off_and_Running-The_Middle_East_Nuclear_Arms_Race.pdf>

Another key determinant for nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East is the desire for nuclear weapons to wage war. This view may be startling to observers who judge that nuclear weapons are only good for deterrence and not for warfighting. But the history of nuclear weapons development shows otherwise. The United States and its NATO Allies during the Cold War deployed nuclear weapons in Europe not as some grand deterrent bluff, but because they intended to use them if the Warsaw Pact forces invaded Western Europe with conventional forces. The United States and its Allies worried that Warsaw Pact forces outnumbered and outgunned NATO forces, so the Alliance would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons to blunt a conventional invasion. Middle Eastern states will probably be making similar calculations. Saudi Arabia, for example, might come to think that the early use of nuclear weapons against Iranian forces invading through Kuwait would be wiser statecraft than letting those forces get an operational foothold in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, where a largely Shia population is alienated from the Sunni Saudi regime and is sympathetic to Iran.